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Abstract
Emerging from a violent past as unlikely partners, the alliance of the United States and
Japan has withstood years of cooperation and competition. Today, the two nations face regional
threats from North Korea and China. Considering the unique alliance, I hope to provide a
framework for understanding inter-alliance management and policy making processes.
Subsequently, I consider one main question in my research. What factors explain continuities
and changes within this alliance relationship? To address this question, I consider leadership role
conception, role prescription, and norms of consultation that contribute to changes within
alliance relations.
Analyzing these variables in the case of the US-Japan alliance provides a clearer
understanding of what contributes to policy change in bilateral alliances. Research on alliances
often fails to address normative variables and attributes much of change to arguments posed in
the realist camp that emphasize system pressures. Focusing on different aspects of decisionmaking expands the research on change in alliances and fills the gap of intra-alliance relations
research. I analyze the alliance at two different time periods in the relationship. First, alliance
relations and security policy during the Nixon and Sato leadership give a better understanding of
the Okinawa Reversion and Nuclear Deterrent issue of 1972. Second, the 1991 Persian Gulf
Crisis raised tensions due to unclear roles and a lack of norms of consultation. The roles that
these nations play in the alliance illustrate how tensions are alleviated or heightened due to role
variation and the strength of consultation norms. Role conceptions and perceptions along with
formal or informal norms of consultation contribute to changes in alliance relations. The
presence of norms of consultation and alignment of roles alleviates tension.
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Introduction
North Korea’s development of a nuclear weapons program and North Korea’s missile
tests in and near the Sea of Japan present unique security challenges for any alliances engaging
in the region.1 The geopolitical situation in the region therefore makes any research on the USJapan alliance valuable. The United States and Japan interact; conscious of these regional threats,
seeking to develop policy that protects against these threats. What factors explain continuities
and changes within this alliance relationship? During the Cold War, the United States sought
alliances to prevent the spread of communism and fascism. The United States formed beneficial
alliances in Northeast Asia via the San Francisco Treaty System.2 The alliance between the
United States and Japan has experienced a number of changes during its history. For the USJapan alliance, tensions caused by change did not break up the alliance. Analysis of decisionmaking and interaction helps to present alternative explanations for change in alliance
relationships that can inform policymakers. This research benefits international relations
literature by seeking to understand leadership interactions in alliances alongside potential factors
that influence policy change in foreign relations.
First, I provide a literature review of alliance literature and include the literature of two
variables that influence our understanding of change in alliance policy. While realist theories
have strengths for understanding alliances, there are limitations that should be addressed.
This review considers two explanations for change in alliance relations. First, roles are important
for understanding nation behavior. Roles provide nations with norms and behaviors for acting in

1

Claire Phipps, “North Korea: ballistic missile launched over Japan – as it happened” The
Guardian, (September 15, 2017).
2
Victor Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2016.)
4
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the international system. According to Holsti, role conceptions are “the perceptions, values, and
attitudes of the actor occupying a position” that are the “crucial independent variables in
explaining role performance.”3 This means that an actors behavior is tied to its role conception.
On the other hand, role perceptions are “the norms and expectations cultures, societies,
institutions, or groups attach to particular positions.”4 Role perceptions tie a certain expectation
or norm to a nation and inform the role conception. Second, norms of consultation are the
socially constructed methods for improving cooperation and co-determination. Thomas Risse
argues that, “norms of regular consultation, of joint-consensus building, and nonhierarchy should
legitimize and enable allied influence.”5 In other words, allies can influence each other through
cooperation and discussion regarding shared interests and policy.
Historical analysis and following decision-making processes help understand US alliance
policy changes over time and improve shared understanding of roles and norms between allies.
Historical analysis researchers analyze the processes and interactions between states to explain
larger trends in the international system. Methodologically, I use process tracing, historical
analysis, and broadly follow some of the methods used by Holsti and Risse-Kappen in their
research on foreign policy decision-making. This methodology helps me to draw parallels with
other policy changes to determine if alliance change is influenced by roles and norms. Primary
documents and policy information give some idea about the processes of decision-making and
possibly show where tensions arise from. Data primarily comes from the Digital National

3

Kalevi J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy.” International
Studies Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1970): 239.
4
Ibid.
5
Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Cooperation among Democracies” (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1995), 34.
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Security Archives. Other sources include newspapers, speeches, and memorandum that I draw
from relevant databases.
I then give a background of the history of the US-Japan alliance for context regarding the
alliance. Following this background, I give data referencing the time when President Richard
Nixon was in office. First, I use data from 1969 to 1972 to discuss the issue of Okinawa’s
reversion from the United States to Japan. This data is primarily in the form of memoranda and
reports on the issue from within the Executive Branch and State Department of the United States
Government. In the second section, I observe the US-Japan alliance during the Gulf War Crisis.
Using information about both President Bush and Prime Minister Kaifu along with content from
government officials, such as speeches and memoranda, I consider how tensions rose in the
alliance at this time period. From my analysis, I conclude that nations that understand each
other’s roles and establish norms of consultation improve foreign policy making because of
better information and mutual understanding.

Review of the Relevant Literature
In this section, I provide a basic review of alliance literature that emphasizes bilateral
alliances. I consider two schools of thought on alliance relations, namely, realist and
constructivist approaches. Much of the current literature on alliances focuses on formation and
explanatory components of alignment. Authors do not often write about the longevity of
alliances and political shifts in alliance relations. A variety of factors can explain cooperation
among states. I consider realism first to acknowledge the importance of the theory, however, I do
not use this approach for explaining my thesis. With regard to constructivism, I discuss a rolebased approach and a normative approach focused on consultation.
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Realist Theory
Realist theory argues that alliances exist to build up material power and prevent conflict
by securing more power than other states.6 In realist theory, there are two primary forms of the
alliance. A balancing alliance occurs when a state forms an alliance to gain a benefit from the
other states’ resources. Alternatively, states form a balancing alliance to oppose threatening
power from rising states. The alternative to a balancing alliance is a bandwagoning alliance.
Bandwagoning alliances occur when an alliance-seeking state joins the stronger side of a conflict
to try to ensure its own safety.7 Importantly, these two types of alliances exist to gain an
advantage against an enemy or prevent enemies from gaining power. In realism then, one type of
alliance is a weaker state aligning with a stronger state to gain protection while the larger state
aims to protect resources and maintain international control.8 Realist theory argues that states’
primary motive is maintaining material power strength over other states and alliances are one
way for states to build material power.
Realists view power as material, emphasizing the importance of military size, amount of
weapons, and economic strength. Moreover, alliances involve “military collaboration” which
entails “military cooperation against particular other states.”9 This cooperation involves physical
presence of material strength. Bilateral alliances continue since there is little need to leave the

6

For an in-depth analysis of realist theory, consider, Stephen Walt’s Origin of Alliances (1990),
Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Relations (1979), George Liska’s Nations in Alliance:
The Limits of Interdependence (1968), and Hans Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations (1948).
7
Charles Glaser, “Realism,” in Contemporary Security Studies, ed. Alan Collins (Oxford
University Press, 2016), 18. Charles Glaser provides these descriptions of balancing and
bandwagoning and uses the Waltzian theory of realism to provide these definitions.
8
George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence, (Washington, DC. Johns
Hopkins Press, 1968). Also read, Stephen M. Walt. 1990. The Origins of Alliances, (Cornell
University) for more on realism.
9
Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability" International Organization 45, no. 1
(1991): 123.
7
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alliance for a weaker power, and stronger states benefit from having additional allies to balance
against opposing large powers.10 Again, this literature emphasizes the importance of balancing
in terms of material power and places much less emphasis on factors like diplomacy, norms, and
a possibility of peace through community. Glenn Snyder considers the alliance to be an “explicit
mutual declaration of future intent” that holds states to engage physically in potential conflict.11
At the system level, he considers alignment as the “expectations held by policymakers”
wondering who will support the other in situations of conflict.12 Alignment is directly related to
conflict and threat of power shifts.
The realist literature exists in two major forms related to the international system.
Structural realism considers power relations in a bipolar system, like in the case of the bipolar
struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Structural realists
argue that smaller states will align with a larger state for security. Traditional realism, on the
other hand, emphasizes factors of threat perception, bargaining, and competition among state
interests.13 The variables considered by traditional realism encompass a larger number of
possible explanations for alliance formation but still place much of the focus on material power.
Certainly, these variables explain aspects of alliance relations.
However, realism fails to explain diplomatic influence over allies or non-use of material
power in conflict. For example, European influence on US foreign policy during the Korean War
cannot be entirely explained by power balancing or shifting threat perceptions.14 Thomas Risse-

10

Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance theory: A neorealist first cut," Journal of International Affairs 44,
no. 1 (1990): 103-123.
11
Snyder, "Alliances, Balance, and Stability,” 123.
12
Ibid.
13
Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The European Influence on US
Foreign Policy (Princeton University Press, 1995), 12.
14
Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 75.
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Kappen argues that US allies in Europe and Canada influenced the United States decisions
surrounding the armistice agreement during the Korean War. The allied negotiations played a
role in shifting the US away from conflict and choose ceasefire instead. Realism also struggles to
explain the absence of conflict, for example, in the case of nuclear non-use. Nina Tannewald
argues that a “nuclear taboo” exists that prevents the use of nuclear weapons. She argues that
there is a global norm of nuclear non-use that comes from antinuclear nonstate actors and public
opinion.15 Realism fails in part because it tends to infer state interests from the power structure of
the international system rather than considering interests independently from the real power
relationships.16 Liberal and constructivist theories can help to understand state interests with
variables like diplomatic communication or role development which influence national interests
without material power change.

Role Theory
When considering bilateral alliances, there are endogenous factors that are at play within
alliance relations. Individual actors within a state often determine the direction of foreign policy.
Role theory emphasizes the importance of elite policymakers in determining foreign policy and
public opinion is considered ineffective in shifting foreign policy generally.17 Broadly, roles are
norms of behavior that involved parties adjust policy toward and subsequent state actions may
suggest conformity or rejection of those norms. Kalevi Holsti considers that role conception is

15

Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” International
Security 29, no. 4 (2005): 5-49.
16 Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 20.
17
Cristian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, "Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on
Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory," Foreign Policy Analysis 8, no. 1
(2012): 5-24.
9
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the set of “appropriate behaviors” related to perceived “functions and positions.”18 Essentially, a
leader determines their appropriate actions based on its conceptualized function within their
position. This position can be within the state or in the international system at large and provides
the leader with a framework for determining his or her functions. A nation’s role is crafted by a
leader and stems from an understanding of function and position in international relations.
The leader’s conception of their nation’s role is potentially significant for determining the
direction of policy in the alliances.19 Analysis of state behavior can benefit from research on role
conceptions for two reasons. First, “identities and role conceptions are social phenomena, they
can be shared, even among most of the individuals in a state.”20 Second, foreign policy makers
act “based on the ideas about the roles of their states in the world and which roles will be
acceptable to their constituents.”21 For these reasons, foreign policy is partially directed by role
conceptions held by foreign policy makers. Leaders construct normative expectations for
themselves and for their allies, resulting in expectations for each nation.
Holsti’s study on role conception provides examples of social and normative factors that
influence a leader to conceive a national role. In foreign policy decision-making, the role
expectations are difficult to determine because of the variation in influence from domestic or
external changes. For both role conception and role prescription factors like culture, citizenship,

18

Kalevi J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy.” International
Studies Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1970): 239.
19
For more research that uses role theory, consider, Kalevi Holsti, “National Role Conceptions
in the Study of Foreign Policy,” (1970), Stephen Walker, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy
Analysis” (1987), James Rosenau, “Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and
Continuity” (1990), and Chavetz, et al, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy: Belarussian and
Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” (1996).
20
Glenn Chavetz, Hillel Abramson, and Suzette Grillot, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy:
Belarussian and Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime.” Political
Psychology 17, (1996): 733.
21
Ibid.
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social mores, traditions, and leaders’ self-conceptions determine the role of the nation.
Endogenous and external factors like political opinion, ally interests, and international conflict
contribute to the formation of role conceptions. According to Holsti, the decisions that result
from a role conception can generally be understood by observing leadership.22 Leaders develop a
role conception, but public opinion, national values, ideology, traditional roles, and political
needs also directly affect national role conceptions. Further pressure comes from treaty
commitments, informal understandings, and external system structures but Holsti argues that
these variables may not be as influential.23
Holsti observes a number of factors that influence the leader in determining their role
and actions. His study focuses on where these role conceptions come from. To determine origin
of roles, he analyzes nine hundred seventy-two leadership statements and agreements between
nations to determine what types of role conceptions exist. He categorizes seventeen role
conceptions perceived by states. Examples of these role conceptions include regional protector,
regional leader, faithful ally, and regional-subsystem collaborator. These concepts are useful
and provide a framework for my understanding of the US-Japan alliance although I use different
terms. The use of these role conceptions moves the research away from analysis of independent
decisions and poses opportunities for the study of more general decision-making. Considering
individual decisions in relation to the national role conception assists in understanding decisionmaking because role conceptions determine behavior.
To test how roles impact foreign policy and alliance relations, I use the approach taken by
Holsti, Chavetz, et al, and Dal and Ersęn. I focus on the speeches, conversations, and writings of

22
23

Holsti, “National Role Conceptions,” 243.
Ibid.
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leaders and other members of foreign policy and government institutions to understand role
conceptions and expectations. I then connect these role conceptions and expectations to role
performance to asses how roles determine foreign policy.

Norms of Consultation
Normative factors play an important role in determining the ability of allies to influence
one another. Allies sometimes determine policies and roles through deliberation and
consultation. Decision-making is a direct result of intra-alliance dialogue between governments.
Regular consultation may arise as a norm within an alliance.24 Analyzing dialogue and norms as
a normative approach helps understand the value of communication in inter-alliance
policymaking. According to Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, constructivists studying
change understand that, “idea shifts and norm shifts are the main vehicles for system
transformation” in an ideational international structure.25 To understand how political change can
occur in alliance structures, understanding norms is important. Changes in policy from
consultations are seen in a number of cases. The US and Great Britain established a norm of
consultation during the Korean War that prevented General MacArthur from attacking China
without prior consultation with the British.26 Western Europe used influence to push the US
towards armistice negotiations in the Korean War.27

24

Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 34.
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change." International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 894.
26
Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 46.
27
Thomas Risse-Kappen, “A Liberal Interpretation of the Transatlantic Security Community,” in
The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 378.
25
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Through norms of consultation, smaller states can influence larger states in an alliance.28
Allied nations like Great Britain can influence US decisions on policies regarding the nuclear
ban and preventing conflict pursuit, such as in the case of the Korean War. Among other
explanations, “norms of regular consultation, of joint-consensus building, and nonhierarchy
should legitimize and enable allied influence.”29 From both allies, increased communication and
deliberation allows for growth of influence from both allies, but particularly for the smaller ally.
Consultation leads to “co-determination” between states and allows for more political symmetry
and shared goals. However, a lack of consultation or a disconnect between two allies in this
regard can strain the relationship and reduce cooperation.
Some argue that “talk is cheap,” but a number of constructivists challenge this view,
seeking to consider communication and consultation affect foreign policy making. For example,
during the Cold War the deliberation during the “two plus four” talks between East and West
Germany, the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union played an important
role in concluding the Cold War.30 The two plus four talks helped establish the reunification of
Germany by 1990 through meetings and other forms of consultation between the group of six
actors. The deliberations that led to reunification show the possibility for nations to debate and
change their goals.31 Communication of norms and desired interests resulted in a largely
beneficial end.

28

Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 37.
Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, 34.
30
Thomas Risse, “‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics” International
Organization 54, no. 1 (2000): 1-39.
31
Ibid.
29

13

Shifting Bilateralism
Research regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons often includes normative
communication as an explanatory variable.32 Rather than real power balancing alone, socially
constructed factors like shared values and communication of norms play a role in preventing the
use of dangerous weapons.33 Political relationships like those between Great Britain and the
United States or Japan and the United States play an important role in exploring the effects of
communication in explaining the changing state of alliances. Communication increases saliency
and helps to “develop mutual trust, confidence, and similar perceptions of international
problems.”34 However, as with many constructivist arguments, there remain challenges for
measurement and operationalization in explaining how much these normative variables really
contribute to influencing foreign policies of allied nations. For the norm of consultation in
particular, two challenges persist. First, the increased use of consultation in alliances may
decrease the norms explanatory power because allies may be less likely to create new norms
once others are established.35 Second, Risse-Kappen recognizes that, “political actors tend to lie
about and obscure their ‘real’ motives.”36 These issues do not necessarily negate the validity of
the study but impact my ability to determine the significance of consultation in certain instances.
The research regarding alliance relations could benefit from more explanations that use
normative variables and methods to explain aspects of foreign policy decision-making. There is a
focus on material power interests in the literature and research on the internal dialogues between

32

Nina Tannewald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear
Non-Use.” International Organization 53, no. 3 (1999): 433-468.
33
Tannewald, “The Nuclear Taboo.”
34
Kalevi J. Holsti, “Change in the International System: Interdependence, Integration, and
Fragmentation,” in Change in the International System eds. Ole R. Holsti, et al, (Boulder,
Westview Press, 1980), 30.
35
Thomas Risse-Kappen. Cooperation Among Democracies, 40.
36
Ibid.
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allies should be included to the literature. I aim to fill this gap of alliance literature by using
alternative explanatory variables that focus on identity and socially constructed relations. I use
role theory as a basis for doing deeper analysis on the effects of identity on alliance relations. I
explore norms alongside identity research, norms of consultation being one example of possible
norms.

Research Design
In this section, I present my variables and methods used for this research. First, I provide
the variables and measurements. Next, I present my hypotheses and consider the implications of
these hypotheses. Finally, I provide a brief overview of the data sources used in my research.
My dependent variable is a change in alliance policy or relations. Change includes an
improvement or deterioration of relations or a specific policy change. To measure changes in
relations, I make assessments of the statements made by policy-makers to determine a view of
the relationship. Policy change is measured by the emergence of a new policy.
My first independent variable is role fulfillment. Role fulfillment occurs when a nation
acts as its role conceptions and expectations suggest. This variable is measured by analyzing
statements and communications between leaders in the alliance and comparing the actions of the
nation against the conceptions and expectation.37
The second independent variable is the norm of consultation. Norms of consultation can
be formal or informal, meaning a treaty or agreement clearly includes them or they exist because
of shared desire to communicate frequently. I measure this variable by searching speeches,
statements, or other communications for language that suggests an interest in consultation or

37

This method is used by Kalevi Holsti in “National Role Conceptions in Foreign Policy” and by
Glenn Chavetz, et al in “Role Theory and Foreign Policy.”
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continued discussion.38 I primarily focus on speeches from leaders but include relevant
statements and speeches members of government closely involved with policymaking.
I test two hypotheses in this research. The first emphasizes the relationship between
nation’s roles and political symmetry between allies. The second considers the effect of norms of
consultation on political symmetry.
H1: Allied nations that fulfill their role conceptions and follow expected behavior will
experience positive change in alliance relations and policy formulation.
H2: Allied nations that employ norms of consultation will have a stronger understanding
of expected behavior and benefit from a more stable, low-tension relationship.
If nations fulfill roles and norms of regular consultation exist, it is likely that changes in
policy or relational status of the allies will be positive and bilateral decision-making will
improve. Role performance can impact an alliance because a country’s role gives allies the
ability to predict actions. If nations understand ally roles, the nation can predict desired outcomes
and can determine policy actions better. Norms of consultation seem closely connected to role
theory and allow allies to determine roles and increase understanding of mutually desired
policies.
The data I used for this study are primary source materials on policies and leadership
statements concerning the role of the allies or that provide some evidence that there is a
consultative relationship that is well established. These primary sources are in the form of
speeches or memoranda directly referencing the policy relations between allied nations. Other
types of data include congressional research reports or Congress member statements.
Furthermore, policy memoranda provide a broader view of alliance relations from within the

38

Thomas Risse-Kappen uses this method in his book Cooperation Among Democracies.
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United States. This information I used comes from the Digital National Security Archive,
Foreign Relations of the United States, and newspaper archives.
It is important to recognize a number of challenges and biases within this research. With
the two different time periods, the relationship’s consultation is further institutionalized as time
progresses. It is difficult to measure the effects of consultation within the alliance over time but
the communications between the governments remain relevant. Unfortunately, formal
consultation norms do not exist for every situation which limits my ability to determine the
effectiveness of formalized norms in policy decision-making. As consultation becomes regular,
allies may not explicitly state that consultation is needed even when consultation occurs
regularly. Over time then, regular norms of consultation may become less clear, but large
amounts of diplomatic and communication data help uncover consultation’s impact. It is also
important to note that government officials and leaders are not always honest about their
interests. Although information can be misleading, words play an important role in
understanding the goals and interests of a nation.
The two selected time periods have different types of information available and the
databases do not provide information that is entirely equal in depth or value. While the case
study of the Okinawa Reversion uses direct statements from leaders in the form of declassified
documents regarding national security policy, the section on the Gulf War uses less information
from classified sources and includes fewer direct statements from the president or close advisors.
However, this section includes a larger variation in the source type and includes Congressional
statements and congressional research.
Finally, a note on my case. The US-Japan alliance is unique because of its long history of
bilateralism and shared decision-making. The United States directly influenced the construction
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of Japan’s constitution and government. Japan relies heavily on US security, which further
implies a unique relationship. Analyzing this alliance gives opportunities to see how decisionmaking processes happen in strong alliances. My two observations within the case, the Okinawa
reversion policy and the Persian Gulf War challenge both present unique opportunities for
analysis. Both are closely tied to security, but the context is significantly different for each. I
chose these separate time periods because I could consider the impact of changing leadership and
shifting international dynamics. The first issue was during the Cold War while the second was
immediately after, and global dynamics shifted. Looking at different time periods allows me to
see whether role dynamics and consultation are truly influential to alliance relations.

Historical Background – US-Japan Alliance Relations since 1945
In 1945, at the end of a brutal conflict, the United States forced the Japanese to surrender
and established a military occupation of the defeated nation. The primary goal of this occupation
was to prevent Japan from remilitarization and fascist rule.39 The United States had to make a
choice to deal with Japan. Ultimately, the US government determined that the best option was to
form a close bilateral security alliance to prevent Japan from aligning with communists in Asia.
This alliance structure enabled the United States to closely monitor Japan and push Japan to
support US interests.40 National Security Advisor George Kennan described Japan as the “key to
Asia” that would allow the United States to engage in the region.41
Three major developments occurred during the occupation of Japan. First, the US
introduced a new constitution in 1947 and established a new government. Article 9 of the

39

Cha, Powerplay, 122.
Cha, Powerplay, 123.
41
Ibid.
40
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constitution was the most significant shift for Japan, which required Japan to “forever renounce
war as a sovereign right” along with a promise not to maintain a “war potential.”42 Second, the
Americans pushed to reform much of the civic environment. The government became a
parliamentary democracy, church and state were separated, and Japan’s education system
reformed to push new liberal democratic values.43 The United States pushed for major economic
reform at this time as well. Early in the occupation, General Douglas MacArthur pushed to
improve economic growth unsuccessfully. Production was low, unemployment was high, and the
possibility of famine was on the horizon. MacArthur and the occupation government, under the
direction of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), implemented some
economic reforms but these were ultimately unsuccessful due to concerns about reparations and
low investment and lending. There was a push from some in the United States to implement a
change in occupation policies.
In 1948, George Kennan presented a report to Secretary of State George Marshall on the
status of the occupation in Japan.44 In his view, the policies of the early occupation were not
beneficial to Japan or the United States. He suggested that a more hands-off approach should be
pursued and “economic recovery should be made the prime objective of the United States policy
in Japan for the coming period.”45 This approach led to a “reversal of US policy in Japan” which
lowered the number of occupation forces, punitive policies, and removed the overly dominant
role that the United States played. Policies sought to protect Japan from external threats and
ensure stable economic growth to eliminate a possible shift towards communism. For example,

42

The Constitution of Japan. Artic. IX.
Cha. Powerplay, 125.
44
George Kennan, “Report by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff,” Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Vol. VI. Document 519, March 25, 1948.
45
Kennan, “Report by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff,” Document 519.
43
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tax reform and inflation control policies revitalized the Japanese economy by 1950. The United
States provided a large amount of humanitarian aid to Japan in the form of food and materials to
improve industry growth. One other major initiative in addition to economic reform was a
decrease of US military presence in Japan. Kennan viewed this decrease as necessary to reduce
the number of US tactical forces to reduce spending and the “psychological impact of their
presence on the Japanese population.”46
In 1951, John Foster Dulles went to Tokyo to discuss the possibility of a peace treaty
with Japan. The proposed treaty was beneficial for Japan and led to an end of purging of
Japanese elites (an occupation strategy to eliminate far-right sympathizers) and Japan received
full sovereignty of the islands, with the exception of Okinawa.47 The peace treaty also required
the United States to consider their regional power position and alliance formation. Victor Cha
argues that the United States formed a bilateral alliance with Japan because it “legitimized and
enshrined America’s near-absolute control over Japan’s internal and external affairs.”48
Ultimately, this strategy, called “powerplay” by Cha, positioned the United States as the
defender of Japan and East Asia from communism and allowed vast control over Japan’s
position in the international system. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida created a strategy that
focused on economic reform while the United States guaranteed the security of Japan. Japan’s
strategy was a direct result of this US decision and shifted Japan to become a nation that would
avoid rearmament and maintain a small defense force. This relationship is the basis for the
military shield that the United States provided for Japan following the occupation.
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One major point of contention seemed to remain at this time. The United States
maintained complete control over Okinawa to fulfill its defensive role in the region. The United
States did not consider Okinawa to be a part of Japan during the occupation and control over the
island did not pose any obvious problems in the eyes of the United States. However, by the
1960s, the Japanese government considered Okinawa to be a part of Japan. It was during this
time that there was a call to revert Okinawa to Japan for the sake of Japan’s sovereignty and the
overall strength of the alliance.
The main negotiations regarding reversion were the debates to pursue a “denuclearized”
reversion of Okinawa. When considering change in the US-Japan alliance, the “denuclearized”
reversion of Okinawa represents the most significant change in US policy in the region. Within
the Nixon government, top security and foreign policy advisors discussed maintaining nuclear
deterrence across the globe frequently. In Japan, the non-nuclear policy remained the largest
concern for reversion. Before reversion, the United States stored nuclear weapons in Okinawa
and regularly transported nuclear weapons in the surrounding sea. Should reversion occur, the
storage of nuclear weapons in Okinawa would directly violate the non-nuclear policy of Japan.
Prime Minister Sato eventually decided that the goal of reversion could only be met if the result
was the denuclearized version.49 Eventually, the United States reverted control of Okinawa to
Japan and the alliance shifted towards a more equal relationship.

49

Kei Waikazumi and John Swenson-Wright, “Denuclearized Reversion: The Prime Minister’s
Decision,” in The Best Course Available: A Personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa
Reversion Negotiations. (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 2012).
21

Shifting Bilateralism

Data and Analysis
The Okinawa Issue: Fulfilled Roles and Important Consultations
Japan took control of Okinawa with full sovereignty in May 1972, following debates over
security and sovereignty in the US-Japan Alliance. The Vietnam War increased tension for the
United States and it was the US view that maintaining a strong relationship with Japan was vital.
Maintaining the alliance ensured that the United States could stay engaged with the war. For
military strength to continue, the United States viewed that the island of Okinawa was the vital
basing location for the United States to maintain regional control. For the Japanese, this was the
most significant political issue for US-Japan relations. It was the view of the Japanese
government and citizens that the US presence in Okinawa represented continued American
oppression and excess control of Japan’s sovereignty. This limit on Japanese sovereignty had
been an issue since the United States first occupied Japan after World War II. The United States
considered Okinawa to be an issue since Kennedy’s presidency. Each of the Prime Ministers of
Japan had sought change to the Okinawa policy very early in the relationship. Most significant in
these efforts were the three prime ministers leading up to reversion – Prime Minister Nobusuke
Kishi, Hayato Ikeda, and Eisaku Sato.
During the 1960s, the United States believed that sending aid to Okinawa and negotiation
with Japan would largely solve the Okinawa problem.50 In 1965, Prime Minister Sato focused
heavily on the reversion of Okinawa and sought to reunite the island with Japan. For Japan, the
major concerns were the US use of bases for nuclear-equipped weapons (B-52 bombers, and
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nuclear submarines, etc.) and the quality of life for Okinawans.51 The United States was
concerned about losing its position in the region because of increasing Japanese domestic
opposition that could damage the stability of the security alliance. 1966 and 1967 signaled the
beginning of major efforts by the Japanese government to negotiate the reversion of Okinawa to
Japan in the next 5 years. President Nixon and his administration focused on reversion in 1969,
when Nixon took office.
Nixon immediately emphasized a larger focus on international relations and the National
Security Council began research on specific foreign policy issues. The Nixon administration
quickly identified Okinawa as a difficult issue and “two key members of the inter-departmental
study group on Okinawa became members of the new NSC staff.”52 With the Japanese Prime
Minister pushing for reversion and Nixon’s staff focusing on US-Japan relations, there was an
immediate move for determining how to best deal with the Okinawa issue.53
The negotiations between the United States and Japan emphasize two important factors
regarding the relationship. The negotiations of the 1960s witnessed significant improvements and
growth in communication between the nations, partially due to shared economic benefits in
combination with growing international interest in Japan. Furthermore, the United States and
Japan shared desired outcomes such as increased security in Asia and growth in global trade.
These negotiations signal both some shared understanding of ally roles and a strengthening in
norms of consultation.
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Fulfilling Roles in the Alliance
A denuclearized reversion was seemingly difficult in the 1960s, particularly because of
the US desire to maintain a strong security stance in Asia. This policy challenge was recognized
by many of the members of the Foreign Ministry in Japan and Sato’s advisors often suggested
that the United States would not easily allow denuclearization. Shimoda Takezō, the ambassador
to Washington at the time, suggested that achieving homeland-level reversion, let alone
denuclearized reversion “would require considerable negotiation and mutual compromise by
both governments.”54
Before Nixon met with Prime Minister Sato in late November of 1969, a State
Department Telegram considered the probable conversation topics between the two leaders. It
emphasized reversion and the “stalemate on nuclear storage.”55 The telegram goes on to state
that the most the United States could hope for was a re-entry policy that would allow the United
States to bring nukes back into Japan if an emergency existed.56 However, this stipulation drew
concern in the United States government and, more specifically, the United States military.
The United States viewed that it should maintain its nuclear security posture in East Asia
and other regions. I consider this goal of maintenance as a part of the US role conception in the
alliance. In 1969, a National Security Council Paper stated that it was generally agreed upon
“that the primary military purposes of our strategic forces are:
•
•

—to reduce the likelihood that nuclear war will occur.
—to protect ourselves and our Allies from the destructive consequence of nuclear wars,
insofar as we can, and
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•

—to be capable of controlling strategic nuclear conflicts so that the possible outcomes
leave the United States and its Allies in a relatively advantageous position.”57

This set of goals suggests that the United States role was considered as a regional protector and
challenger of communism. The United States viewed itself as what I would call a “peace
enabler” or “peaceful guardian.” On November 4, 1972, Nixon spoke about peace in a
nationwide radio address. He spoke about a “structure of peace” that he was attempting to create
through “prolonged democracy” and “strength.”58 He argued that part of this peace structure was
the development of “patterns of international behavior that will be accepted by other powers.”59
Nixon’s statements reflect his desire to fulfill the US role as a peace enabler or guardian. The US
nuclear shield policy was an extension of the structure of peace intended to deter enemies and
protect allies in the event of nuclear weapon use. To add to this, the philosophy of the Nixon
Doctrine was to remain committed and contribute to a peaceful world.60 Much of Nixon’s focus
was on Asia and he was willing to protect allies if nuclear attack occurred but hoped to avoid
military involvement.61 The nuclear shield was vital to the strategy for preventing threats from
other nations.62 The nuclear umbrella, or “extended deterrence” policy was an arm of the US
peace structure and maintaining was vital to fulfilling the US role.
Japan was averse to nuclear weapons since the occupation and domestic pressure in Japan
contributed to Sato’s decision to push for a denuclearized reversion. Japan’s role conception was
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the faithful ally seeking to achieve peace. In a January 3, 1972 meeting between Ambassador
Johnson and Ambassador Ushiba, the Japanese diplomat told Johnson that, “the concept of
deterrence is still very unclear to Japanese politicians.”63 This quote illustrates the opposition of
roles between the United States and Japan. Moreover, the quote suggests how consultation could
benefit the alliance because more developed consultation may have helped the Japanese
understand the need for deterrence capability. The Japanese government believed that as tensions
decreased, deterrent power should decrease as well. A misunderstanding of deterrence policy
could contribute to a difference in role performance. This disagreement about policy behavior
could also contribute to problems with completing denuclearized reversion.
Allowing US nuclear presence near Okinawa following reversion ensured that both allies
fulfilled their role conceptions. The United States continued to fulfill its role as the peaceful
guardian and Japan fulfilled its role as the peaceful partner opposed to a nuclear Okinawa and
gained control over the island. The reversion was a crucial change in the relationship and helped
stabilize the relationship. Because both nations fulfilled certain role conceptions, namely the
guardian and support roles, expected behavior became clearer and the alliance maintained its
stability. This policy shift supports the first hypothesis. Nations that are able to fulfill their roles
are better allies because they follow expected allied behavior and know what to expect from
allies.

How Consultations Helped Reversion
In a US Embassy status report to the State Department in 1970, a joint communiqué
between Nixon and Sato outlines the interests of the two countries. After reaffirming the Treaty
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of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the two “agreed to enter immediately into consultations
regarding specific arrangements, with the necessary legislative support, for accomplishing the
early (during 1972) reversion of Okinawa without detriment to the security of the Far East,
including Japan.”64 Many of the documents from this time-period indicate that continued
consultations should occur, at least informally. The United States repeatedly spoke on the
importance of maintaining a security structure in the region – with the goal of deterring
communist expansion. The joint Nixon-Sato statement heavily emphasized norms of consultation
for creating effective reversion policies. The joint communiqué from Nixon and Sato reads, “The
President and the Prime Minister agreed that their Governments should consult closely to assure
a smooth transfer of administrative rights, including the solution of a number of financial and
economic problems.”65 The document points to the US-Japan Consultative Committee as the
group tasked with pushing through the necessary work that would enable the reversion to go
smoothly. For Nixon and his foreign policy team, a smooth reversion was considered necessary
early on to ensure that the United States got to maintain involvement in the region. Nixon and
Sato viewed these consultations as integral to creating mutually beneficial reversion policies.
The status report includes details of preparatory work the United States was doing to
ensure a smooth reversion of Okinawa and explains the United States role perception for Japan.
According to the report, the most important goals for the United States were to maintain US
business presence on Okinawa, to transfer civil administrative duties to the Japanese
government, to shift defense responsibilities to Japan, and to build up economic strength of the
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island for its residents. Japan granted control of Okinawa to the United States under the Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States, a treaty signed in 1960.
Notably, the agreement states that, “Japan will grant the United States of America … the use of
facilities and areas in the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands in accordance with the Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security … and its related arrangements.”66 So, while reversion policy
was largely agreed upon, the issue surrounding nuclear weapons policy persisted because the
United States was previously granted free reign to use military facilities on Okinawa.
Prime Minister Sato viewed consultation as a key aspect of the security relationship
between the United States and Japan. In remarks to the Diet on January 31, 1968, he discussed
the requirements for the possibility of a nuclear armed submarine arriving in Japan.67 He stated
that prior consultation was necessary for any US weapons entering the country.68 The United
States had to consult Japan about bases on Japan, but Okinawa continued to have nuclear
weapons stored there until 1972. This required consultation regarding weapons is implied by
Article IV of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and consultation certainly occurred
leading up to the decision on reversion.69
Based on the Japanese decision to allow the United States to use bases and transport
nuclear weapons into Japan, they understood the US defensive role while still paying attention to
domestic public opinion. These domestic struggles, in part, cemented the Japanese role
perception of an anti-nuclear Japan that contrasted the US conception of Japan. Although Sato
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was opposed to nuclear weapons from early on, it remains unclear what ultimately pushed him to
seek the denuclearized reversion.70 The decision seems partially influenced by the role
conception that Sato had for Japan as a security ally of the United States. The secret decision to
allow nuclear weapons to enter the country also signals his belief in the importance of the US
defensive role. It is important to recognize that this was a secret decision because it suggests that
leaders, ambassadors, diplomats, and policymakers consulted regularly behind the scenes.
It is also significant to note that many of the conversations regarding nuclear weapons
occurred during backchannel negotiations. These consultations occurred for many years before
reversion and particularly during the Nixon-Sato period. A norm of consultation does exist
between the United States and Japan. The norm is explicitly stated in the US-Japan Security
Treaty but also underlies the overall behavior of the United States and Japan as allies. The
reversion negotiations are examples of this norm working both explicitly and informally. The
norm of consultation is one of many possible norms that helps settle disputes. In the case of the
Okinawa reversion negotiations, the second hypothesis is supported, if only marginally. The
frequent deliberations about Okinawa during the Nixon presidency suggest that consultation
helped create the reversion policy. Reversion was a major policy concern for a time and norms of
consultation were able to address this type of policy-making process. Norms were established for
transfer of government power during the occupation and may have contributed to the smooth
reversion of Okinawa.
Ultimately, the United States made the decision to give control of Okinawa back to Japan
by the year of 1972. The agreement stipulated that the United States was required to remove
nuclear weapons from Okinawa on the condition that they could place them back on the island in
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the case of an emergency. The United States was also allowed to bring these nuclear weapons
into any base in Japan rather than Okinawa alone. The United States continued to store nuclear
weapons and transport them in and out of Japan even following reversion.71 In a briefing paper
on reversion in 1972, the United States maintained this position and refused to allow inspection
of possible storage sites in Japan. This silence is a part of a policy of non-confirmation
previously established to maintain secrecy about the location of nuclear weapons. It is therefore
likely that nuclear weapons remained either on or very nearby Japan.72 In 1972, however, this
policy decision-making process facilitated consultation and allowed both the United States and
Japan to fulfill their individual role conceptions.

The Persian Gulf War and the Alliance: Role Mismatch and Weak Consultation
In the first post-Cold War conflict, the Persian Gulf War, Japan struggled to understand
its role as a part of the international community. Japan’s decision-making following the Persian
Gulf War created tension with the United States at the time.73 The slow response of Japan and
the lack of clarity about US requests for assistance ultimately increased tensions between the
United States and Japan. This conflict occurred at the same time that the United States and Japan
were having economic disagreements due to large growth in the Japanese economy in the 1980s.
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Both nations had an interest in the oil of the Gulf region but did not have similar security policies
toward the region. Japan did not engage militarily during this conflict while the United States
committed approximately 500,000 personnel. In this section, I analyze Congressional Reports,
US Congress member statements, and leadership statements to provide an understanding of the
US-Japan alliance during the Gulf War Crisis and the tensions that arose due to lack of
communication and misunderstanding of roles.
The Gulf Crisis started when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990.
Saddam Hussein argued that Kuwait was stealing oil and Kuwait’s high production of oil placed
Iraq at an economic disadvantage.74 Iraq sought compensation for the allegedly stolen oil.
Saddam Hussein had a strategic interest in Kuwait, owed the nation a significant amount of
money from the Iran-Iraq war, and sought access to the Persian Gulf and increased oil reserves.75
The response from the international community was quick and it unanimously condemned the
attack the day after it occurred. The United States aimed to have the Iraqi forces removed from
Kuwait by January 1991. When this did not occur, the United States and a coalition force
launched a series of attacks on Iraq and the Iraqi forces.76 Ultimately, the coalition forces pushed
Iraq out of Kuwait and the war ended. Although the United Nations and the allied nations were
unified in their actions toward Iraq, tensions arose between the United States and Japan at this
time due to disagreements about the proper responses for the two allies.
Japan’s relationship with the Middle East was largely uneventful prior to 1990. Japan
purchased oil from the region through the 1970s and 1980s but was largely disconnected from

74

Robert Owen Freedman, The Middle East After Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait. (Gainesville,
University Press of Florida, 1993), 4.
75
Freedman, The Middle East, 5.
76
Catalinac, “Identity Theory and Foreign Policy,” 61.
31

Shifting Bilateralism
politics in the region.77 Japan’s relationship with the Middle East was primarily an economic one
that benefited by purchasing oil during the 1970s and 1980s. Japan’s role conception in the
international system remained closely tied to US security interests and did not seem tied to the
Middle East.
The US decision to invade Iraq challenged Japan’s role conception within the alliance
and within the international system at large. With the Cold War at an end, Japan had solidified its
role as the pacifist partner to the United States. The actions of Japan during the Persian Gulf War
signaled and instance when the United States questioned Japan’s role in the alliance.78 The
Japanese role in this conflict was constructed by exogenous pressures and a lack of developed
international role. How was Japan to act as an ally without a role conception in the post-Cold war
era?
On August 5, 1990, Japan imposed economic sanctions on Iraq prior to following the
United Nations resolutions.79 Japan quickly condemned the invasion and “froze Kuwaiti assets in
Japan, embargoed Iraqi exports, halted Japanese private loans and investment to Iraq, and
suspended official aid and trade credits.”80 Japan imported about sixty percent of its oil from the
Gulf Region in 1990 but stopped importing oil during the Gulf War due to large reserves.81 In the
following weeks and after forceful convincing from members of the United States government,
Japan halted trade with Iraq and gave 100 million dollars to a coalition force.82 Eventually,
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Japan gave approximately one billion dollars to support the coalition forces in the Middle East. A
few weeks later, this sum increased to four billion dollars. Japanese contributions totaled
thirteen billion by the end of the conflict.83 The economic response of Japan’s government
supported US interests in the region.
However, the United States believed that Japan’s financial contributions were not
enough. According to a 1990 Yomiuri newspaper article in Japan, “U.S. Officials stated that
these efforts were not enough and cautioned that Japan would face criticism ‘unless Japanese
flags fly in the Gulf.’”84 The Japanese government was caught between the United States
pressure to contribute more than financial support and the Japanese public and government call
to avoid military contributions.

Roles Lost in Translation
Japan faced two major challenges that slowed decision-making processes regarding the
conflict. First, negative public opinion of the government response along with budgetary
constraints prevented reactionary policy pursuits. Second, the United States continuously sent
mixed signals about its interests abroad. Together, these two difficulties intensified the strain in
the relationship. It was the view of the United States government that Japan failed to meet the
expectations of an economically powerful nation in the post-Cold war international community.
To illustrate these difficulties further, I use a Congressional Research Service (CRS)
report and a number of cables between the US Embassy in Tokyo and the Secretary of State,
officials and researchers scrutinized Japan’s actions alongside US actions. The authors of the
CRS report discussed the effects of the Gulf Crisis on the US-Japan alliance and argued that the
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invasion “represented a major test for the U.S.-Japan alliance relationship.”85 The report suggests
that the tension between the United States and Japan arose from economic competition and a
lowered security threat from the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War.86 In meetings between
United States and Japanese officials, “President Bush and other U.S. leaders made clear … that
the United States expected Japan to do more than offer political support” and some officials
“expected Japan to have a ‘physical presence’ in the Gulf” rather than merely maintaining a
financial commitment.87 While there was acknowledgment of Japan’s constitutional limits,
“officials at the White House, U.S. Ambassador Michael Armacost and others were in favor of
such a [military] presence and suggested it to Japanese leaders.”88 Kaifu’s attempts to engage
militarily failed due to lack of support from the Diet. At one point, the Kaifu administration did
try to introduce a bill that would allow about one thousand Self-Defense Force members to go to
the region in a support role, but Diet opposition quickly challenged this proposition and LDP
support was essentially nonexistent.89 It was not until after the conflict had ended that Japan
recognized how to play a role in the post-Cold War community.
The United States goal in the Gulf Crisis was twofold. The United States desired to
sustain the sovereignty of Kuwait and defend the supply of oil in the region. President Bush
outlined these goals in a speech to Congress in 1990. He emphasized the need for the United
States to “defend common vital interests … support the rule of law … and stand up to
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aggression.”90 He also spoke about the economic risks Iraq’s invasion posed: “an Iraq permitted
to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military power … to intimidate and coerce its
neighbors.”91 Bush’s assertion is that Iraq may use its new power to gain more control of oil
reserves. However, in the months leading up to the war, Bush and his administration struggled to
explain the US goals to different audiences, including allies abroad.92 This challenge in the
alliance suggests a lack of clear US goals, which resulted in a negative effect on public opinion
in the United States and created confusion in Japan about US interests.93 Specifically, the
unspecified interests and statements provided by the Bush administration fail to inform Japan
about what behavior should be expected. This necessarily creates difficulty within the alliance
and consultation would have made US interests clearer to allies.
In the United States, members of Congress and other US officials bemoaned the fact that
the United States was taking on much of the burden of the effort and its allies were not doing
enough. For example, representative Duncan Hunter introduced a bill that would push the
President to negotiate with Japan to increase Japan’s economic contribution to the Gulf Crisis.94
The goal was to make Japan pay the United States the amount equal to Japanese oil imports from
the Middle East in 1990. If they failed to pay, the U.S. would impose import duties on Japan.95
Representative Pete Stark shared his frustration in the House of Representatives when he said,
“Why not quit complaining about our budget deficits and help pay more of the cost of the
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Persian Gulf operation” in reference to an article discussing Japan’s frustration with the United
States failing to lower its budget deficit.96 As the United States paid more for air strikes and
military engagement in the region, some found the Japanese lack of involvement frustrating. For
“many U.S. officials, the Japanese government largely failed the test by responding to the crisis
in ways that gave priority to Japanese political, legal and fiscal restraints at the expense of
broader international responsibilities.”97 Japan failed to fulfill the role as the partner that the
United States perceived it should be.
From a foreign policy perspective, the decision-making process for the Japanese
government was difficult. The potential for both international and domestic backlash were
present, albeit for different reasons. Prime Minister Kaifu was responding to criticism from the
Japanese public regarding the U.S. invasion and the Liberal Democrat Party government was
concerned about committing to a military response.98 There seem to be two main reasons for this
hesitation. First and most obviously, the constitutional restriction on military use constrained
Japan significantly. The ambiguity of constitutionally legitimate actions exacerbated this
problem. Use of force was restricted by the constitution except for cases of self-defense.99
Second, it seems that Kaifu did not recognize the magnitude of the invasion, resulting in his slow
response and inability to make a decision regarding the Self Defense Force.100 He did introduce a
bill at the time that would have allowed the SDF to be sent to Iraq, but by October the Japanese
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Diet voted it down.101 Even with relatively fast-acting initial decision to commit to the United
Nations sanctions, other decision-making was slow and vague and the Japanese government
“stumble[d] almost continuously” while trying to formulate policy toward the Persian Gulf
war.102
The Japanese public and some members of the government did not support engagement
with the conflict. While the oil supplies were important to Japan, Kaifu and others asserted that
the conflict had little effect on Japan.103 The United States had a number of reasons for engaging
in the war, but Japan considered the conflict to be a “fire on the other side of the river.”104
Providing financial support seemed to be the policy that allowed Japan to fulfill a role as a
pacifist partner to the United States. The government and public both had concerns about
engaging militarily. As evidence of this, Japan designated the first four billion dollars of support
for non-lethal activities.105 Moreover, Japan believed that the US response would elicit increased
conflict.106 Japan was focused on issues closer to home and working towards energy
independence prior to the crisis and did not aim to change its policy. Japan hoped to maintain its
role as the pacifist partner with the United States fulfilling its security needs.
The US role conception as stated by President Bush aimed to deter the aggression of
states like Iraq and help other nations in self-defense.107 The president and his administration
suggested that the United States was prepared to lead the international community in ending this
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crisis. President Bush, in a joint session of Congress said, “there is no substitute for American
leadership.”108 Secretary of State James Baker said, in 1990, “we remain the one nation that has
the necessary political, military, and economic instruments at our disposal to catalyze a
successful response by the international community.”109 As the U.S. fulfilled its role conception
as the international coalition leader, it pressured other nations to follow in its footsteps to halt
Iraq’s aggression. The Bush administration used public statements to emphasize its expectations
of the international community and “U.S. officials used their allies’ dependence to pressure
them.”110 US political leaders met with other world leaders “to underscore that the burden of this
collective effort must be shared” and to fail to do so foundered the relationship.111 Japan’s slow
reactions and internal debates suggested a lack of conviction to the United States. For some, “the
Japanese response reinforced [doubts about cooperating] with Japan because of what they [U.S.
officials] view as fundamentally divergent and competing economic and other interests of the
two countries.”112 The tension that arose during this conflict was partially based upon a lack of
shared understanding of roles.
The evidence in this section illustrates that mismatched interests and misunderstood roles
of the United States and Japan plagued the relationship. The mismatch of expectations supports
the first hypothesis because tensions rose between the two nations and the allies did not
formulate a mutual policy regarding the conflict. Japan did not have developed role conceptions
for engagement in international crises and the United States held high expectations for allies.

108

Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress,” September 11, 1990.
Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, Kim R. Nassal, “Bound to Follow? Leadership and
Followership in the Gulf Conflict,” Political Science Quarterly 106, (1991): 393.
110
Bennett, et al, “Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War,” 51.
111
Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress,” September 11, 1990.
112
Niksch and Sutter, “Japan’s Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis,” 1.
109

38

Shifting Bilateralism

How Role Confusion Impacts Consultation
In 1990, Japan misunderstood the US role and the lack of consultation intensified the
problems of role mismatch. Japan’s role conception as a peaceful supporter of US foreign policy
did not fit with the US role perception of Japan as a burden-sharing ally that should do more than
provide political and financial support. Moreover, Japan’s role in the international post-Cold War
community was not developed in such a way that allowed Japan to have strong decision-making
abilities in this case. Japan played the role of the pacifist partner since World War II and the Gulf
Crisis was the first instance where they were expected to break that role developed over 40 years.
Breaking away from a role constructed over decades does not happen easily. Japan failed to see
the importance of this conflict in the same light that the United States saw the conflict because of
the mismatch of role conception and perception alongside a lack of consultation. The oildependent United States overestimated the Japanese dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Japan
sought energy independence. The lack of regular consultation intensified these problems because
the allies did not share direct interests, and the allies had not considered what their interaction
would be in international conflict.
Japan’s role conception remained as a peaceful partner of the United States and this role
mismatch constrained Japan’s ability to consult with the United States. Because individuals,
groups, and larger communities socially construct norms over long periods of time, consulting
about sudden issues through the usual channels fails. US-Japan relations focused largely on
economics in the 1980s, and the US-Japan alliance maintained its protector-partner security
relationship. Japan’s economic growth throughout the 1970s and 1980s did create two challenges
for their role. First, the United States role expectation for Japan shifted and US officials believed
that Japan should fulfill leadership roles. Second, the economic growth combined with the
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effects of sudden conflict pressured Japan “to take on new global political responsibilities” yet
did not prepare Japan for engaging directly in conflict.113
The formal norms of consultation in US-Japan treaties and agreements were established
to ensure continued discussion of the defense of Japan in case of conflict. The US-Japan
relationship emphasized economic ties so consultation would have occurred more frequently
regarding issues of trade or currency rather than armed conflict. Because the Gulf Crisis emerged
so quickly, Japan was not prepared to consult about the process for offensive military
engagement, particularly outside of Asia. Moreover, Japan’s embrace of pacifism constrains
Japan’s ability to engage anyway. The slow response of the Japanese government shows the lack
of preparedness for this type of situation and the desire to remain pacifistic.114
The Gulf War therefore served as a push for Japan to become an international community
member. First and foremost, the role that Japan should play in the international system was
unclear at the beginning of the crisis. The Japan of the post-Cold War was “apprehensive about
what it sees as the imposition on it of unwanted roles by the United States.”115 The United States
shift in expectations was sudden and consultation on new Japanese role expectations did not
occur. Japan’s desired role would have maintained a commercial focus that benefits from a
pacifistic security policy.116 Following the conflict however, it seemed that there was an
increased desire in Japan to play a larger role in the international community. In a memorandum
to Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia John Kelly it was noted that
“Japan is seeking a way to move beyond ‘checkbook diplomacy’ to a more active leadership role
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in the emerging new world order.” This, along with similar assessments, suggested that the Gulf
Crisis was a wake-up call to Japan; one that was “a positive step toward mitigating this tension”
that arose due to the crisis.117
Ultimately, this conflict forced Japan to have a deeper interest in playing a role in the
international community and moving beyond ‘checkbook diplomacy.’118 First, because Japan had
received backlash from the United States, there was an increased desire to engage more in the
future. Second, this conflict lowered public respect for Japan in the United States and increased
anti-American sentiments in Japan.119 Ambassador Armacost suggested that Japan learned from
the crisis that it could not merely follow the United States lead in foreign policy.120 By doing
“too little too late … Japan has been intermittently exposed to such criticism from abroad” which
has had both negative and positive effects.121 It has both created isolationist desire but also an
increased desire to play a more proactive role in the international system rather than a reactive
one. However, the institutionalized anti-military sentiment still exists strong in Japan, even after
the tensions from the Gulf Crisis.
Although the impacts of the conflict did not improve the alliance relationship, the
findings support the hypotheses. The first hypothesis is supported by the lack of role
understanding in the conflict. The United States fulfilled its role but had expectations that Japan
failed to meet, resulting in tensions increasing. The second hypothesis is supported, albeit, less
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than the first. Consultation is difficult to assess in this case for three reasons. First, the Gulf
Conflict occurred suddenly, making any significant amount of consultation unlikely to occur.
Second, the lack of a developed role for Japan in military conflict weakened Japan’s ability to
consult about engagement. Finally, social pressures from inside of Japan constrained the
government’s ability to make decisions about the conflict early on. Japan had to act quickly but
did not have the experience to do so.

Conclusion
Based on my findings, role theory provides a framework for understanding how roles
contribute to the determination of US foreign policy decision-making toward allies. Second, a
norm of consultation can improve the ability to determine policies if implemented early in the
alliance. These two variables can positively influence change in alliance relations between two
countries.
This research suggests that these variables are also not mutually exclusive or even
alternative explanations for decision-making in foreign policy. It seems that these explanations
complement other explanations and expand the understanding about decision-making. Increased
understanding and compliance with roles improves the ability of two allies to make welldeveloped policy decisions. Consultation may foster increased mutual understanding of roles and
of possible domestic pressures from each nation. Furthermore, domestic politics and domestic
interests seem to play a large role in determining how foreign policy decision-making is done. Of
course, issues of national security also influence decision making on foreign policy, particularly
in the context of defense and security policy.
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The data that I collected and analyzed support the proposed hypotheses; changes in
alliance relations and policy decision-making are partially influenced by understanding of
national role conceptions and norms of regular consultation. The decision to revert a
“denuclearized” Okinawa to Japan signals a mutually beneficial political decision. Okinawa’s
reversion was beneficial to Japan because it eased domestic pressures and granted sovereignty.
For the United States the policy was beneficial because the United States maintained its
defensive capabilities in the region. The normative basis for consultation found in agreements
and many secret conversations between US and Japanese leaders suggests that consultation is
positively influential for decision-making. The Persian Gulf Crisis, on the other hand, suggests a
more complex relationship challenge for the United States and Japan. The lack of shared role
conceptions and expectations post-Cold War increased tension between the allies. In the 1990s,
consultation was less effective because Japan’s role conceptions did not meet the United States
expectations and a norm had not developed to formulate conflict policies outside of the
protector-partner relationship.
Foreign policy creation, particularly focused on alliances, can benefit by integrating
methods for identifying roles and improving the norm of consultation. If the United States and
Japan were to focus more on where the roles come from, namely, how domestic pressures impact
role development, policymakers could predict allies’ interests sooner. Greater attention to ally’s
roles would also increase trust between nations because roles give some predictive power and
strengthen understanding of national interests. Consultation is a necessary part of any
relationship, though particularly pertinent for international relations. Integrating formal
structures for the norm of consultation seems more powerful than assuming it will occur. While
leaders will consult over policy, it would be beneficial to establish an agreement that explicitly
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states the intention to consult over specific policies repeatedly. In these ways, foreign policy
could be beneficially impacted by deeper understanding of roles and norms of consultation.
In future research, studies that use consultation should consider framing specific
agreements and assessing how the effectiveness of the formalized norm changes over time.
Analyzing these same variables in the context of other alliances may also be beneficial to
verifying the usefulness of this form of analysis. The norm of consultation is only one possible
norm that can be impacted by role variation and it would be valuable to consider alternative
norms and their relationship to the role of the nation. If I were to continue this work, I would
analyze the formation of the United States and Japanese role conceptions and address how
domestic challenges effect role conception in greater depth. It is important for future research to
provide a complete picture of role development to ensure the validity of leadership behavioral
analysis. Roles and consultation provide a lot of opportunities for analyzing change and decisionmaking. Research on decision-making should aim to combine theory and practice for
understanding foreign policy change in alliances.
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